HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY

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CHAPTER 1

People Are Culturally Shaped Shapers

The Psychological Science of Culture and Culture Change

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The term "culture" is everywhere today as people strive to make sense of their increasingly diverse and divided worlds. To say "It's cultural," or "It's a culture clash," or "We need a culture change" is becoming idiomatic, and lay cultural theories and hypotheses abound. In this chapter, we review how the psychological science of culture has advanced in the past decade and how psychologists are providing insights to today's most pressing issues. In the first section, we explain some foundational ideas of the science of cultural psychology, introduce the culture cycle, and summarize how different culture cycles shape different ways of being a person. In the second section, we describe several crosscutting generalizations about people and about culture that have become more fully theorized and empirically grounded since the first edition of this volume was published. In the third section, we review some key empirical insights from the field that have emerged over the past decade. And finally, we consider how to apply some of the insights of cultural psychology to understand contemporary culture clashes and divides, as well as envision psychologically grounded approaches to culture change.

The term "culture" is everywhere. Lay cultural theories and hypotheses abound as people strive to make sense of their increasingly diverse and divided worlds. People invoke culture as they confront problems in education, health, criminal justice, sports, entertainment, business, economic development, and sustainability, and as they contend with power and inequality in these domains (e.g., racism, sexism, classism, homophobia, imperialism). To say "It's cultural," or "It's a culture clash," or "We need a culture change" is becoming idiomatic. What precisely counts as "culture" can be geographically based and focus on familiar distinctions—such as the East versus the West, the West versus the Rest, the Global North versus the Global South—but it is also no longer geographically bound. Culture includes other distinctions such as social class or socioeconomic status (SES); race, ethnicity, or tribe; gender and sexuality; region of the country, state, or city; religion; profession, workplace, or organization; life stage and generation; immigration status; and many more (A. Cohen, 2014; Gelfand & Kashima, 2016; Markus & Conner, 2014; Uskül & Oishi, 2018). A "culture" or "cultural context" serves as a label for any significant social category associated with shared ideas

(e.g., values, beliefs, meanings, assumptions) and practices (e.g., ways of doing, making, and being) that organize people's experiences and behavior.

We begin the chapter with a selection of recent findings to highlight the fact that culture matters in every domain of life, and that the cultures under study in the field are an increasingly diverse set, as are the researchers who are the studying them. These findings show how culture is at work in our world sometimes in predictable or understandable ways, and sometimes in surprising or unseen ways. Figure 1.1 highlights recent examples of how cultures influence everyday experience—in school, at work, in the marketplace, on our streets, in our communities, and across borders.

This chapter is organized into four sections: (1) cultural psychology: what is it?; (2) what cultural psychologists know about persons and cultures; (3) recent empirical insights and advances; and (4) looking ahead: from culture clashes to culture change. In the first section, we explain some foundational ideas of the science of cultural psychology, introduce the culture cycle, and summarize how different culture cycles shape different ways of being a person. In the second section, we describe several crosscutting generalizations about people and about culture that have become more fully theorized and empirically grounded over the past decade. In the third section, we review some key empirical insights from the field since the first edition of this volume was published. And finally, we consider how to apply some of the insights of cultural psychology to understand contemporary culture clashes and divides, and envision psychologically grounded approaches to culture change.

CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY: WHAT IS IT?

Mutual Constitution: The Psychological Is Cultural and the Cultural Is Psychological

The studies sketched in Figure 1.1 compare people across a wide range of sociocultural distinctions and divides. Studies like these, and thousands of others, now provide robust evidence for the basic social-psychological insight that *the situation is powerful*. People who experience different social circumstances and situations, what we call here "sociocultural contexts," as a consequence of nation, social class, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, generation, profession, and more, are likely to respond to different norms and incentives. They are also likely to understand the world using different interpretive frameworks (also called "construals," "schemas," "perspectives," "mindsets," "mentalities," or "meanings").

Some of psychology's earliest theorizing reflects a commitment to the ways in which psychological processes are made up of, or are made by, the social elements of a person's many intersecting contexts (although the term *culture* was not explicitly invoked until later). Wundt, a founding figure in modern psychology, believed that no thought, judgment, or evaluation could be methodologically isolated from its sociocultural base (Graumann, 1986). More explicitly, Lewin (1948), one of social psychology's intellectual founders, wrote:

> The perception of social space and the experimental and conceptual investigation of the dynamics and laws of the processes in social space are of fundamental and theoretical and practical importance. . . . The social climate in which a child lives is for the child as important as the air it breathes. The group to which the child belongs is the ground on which he stands. (p. 82)

As Lewin (1946/1951) also proposed "the person (P) and his environment (e) have to be viewed as variables which are *mutually dependent upon each other*. In other words, to understand or predict behavior the person and the environment have to be considered as *one constellation of interdependent factors*" (pp. 239–240; emphasis added).

Although social psychology is one of the foundational disciplines for cultural psychology, many social-psychological studies examine the behavior of strangers—often college students—in laboratory-generated situations. This constrained, lab-based analog of the social environment is designed for the purpose of controlling the situation and specifying which aspects of situations cause behavior change. Cultural psychology research includes comparisons across a wider range of social circumstances, and encompasses more within the scope of "the situation" than has been typical in social psy-



FIGURE 1.1. Culture at work in the world: A sample of recent findings.

chology. From the wide-angle perspective of cultural psychology, cultures are powerful situations—albeit situations writ larger, longer-term, more complex, and messier than those typically explored in traditional social-psychological studies. One goal of cultural psychology is to specify the multiple intertwining micro, meso, and macro mechanisms through which situations wield their power.

The number of definitions of "culture" rivals the number of cultures themselves (e.g., Kroeber & Kluckholn, 1952). Heine (2015), in his cultural psychology textbook, draws on Richerson and Boyd (2005) to define culture as "any kind of idea, belief, technology, habit, or practice that is acquired through learning from others. Humans are therefore a cultural species" (p. 7). Morris, Chiu, and Liu (2015a) define culture as a system: "Culture is a loosely integrated system of ideas, practices, and social institutions that enable coordination of behavior in a population" (p. 632). Some theorists (Adams & Markus, 2004; Shweder, 1991, 2003) have returned to the insights of Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952), who highlight the ongoing *mutual constitution* of cultures and psyches:

> Culture consists of explicit and implicit *patterns* of historically derived and selected ideas and their embodiment in institutions, practices, and artifacts; cultural patterns may, on one hand, be considered as products of action, and on the other as conditioning elements of further action. (as summarized by Adams & Markus, 2004, p. 341; emphasis in original)

This definition conceptualizes culture as a system or as a cycle—a recurring sequence of interrelated activities that reflect and reinforce each other. The sequence here is made up of sociocultural patterns that condition people's actions, and people's actions, in turn, reinforce and change cultures. In the words of this chapter's title, *people are culturally shaped shapers.*

Throughout the chapter, we use the terms "culture" and "cultural" for simplicity's sake. Yet the term "sociocultural" is probably preferable for communicating the full scope of cultural psychology (Markus & Hamedani, 2007). A "cultural analysis" as we define it includes both the conceptual and the material aspects of cultre. It includes both *meanings*—ideas, images, representations, attitudes, values, mindsets, schemas, and stereotypes—and what is often treated separately, *the structural and the material*—cultural products, interpersonal interactions, and formal and informal institutional practices, policies, norms, and rules of all types. Likewise, we often use the phrase "sociocultural context" in place of the term "culture." The term "culture" is sometimes used to convey something more fixed, monolithic, or bounded than intended here. A "sociocultural context" is meant to convey a system with some patterning and organization, but with more dimensionality, more openness, more malleability, more variation, and less coherence.

Cultural patterns condition people's food and festivals, but significantly, for psychologists, they also condition people's thoughts, feelings, and actions. As such, *the psychological is cultural.* Humans require multiple intersecting cultures to become people. Cultural transmission is more than just a matter of exposure, learning, and norm-following. Cultural formations of all sorts offer invitations for how to live and how to be. In turn, people often accept these invitations and their associated meanings and expectations so as to identify, affiliate, and belong to various cultural groups (Kashima, 2016; Shweder, 1991; Tomasello, 2011, 2016). As people adapt to the resources, requirements, and norms of different situations and circumstances, which have different requirements, incentives, and meaning-making tools, their psychologies become different. This means that cultures and situations do more than just *influence* people; rather, they give rise to particular psychological and behavioral *patterns.* Situations and cultures are in fact not separate from people. They constitute them or make them up.

With a cultural psychological approach to culture, the focus is on how psychological processes can be implicitly and explicitly shaped by the situations, worlds, contexts, or sociocultural systems that people inhabit. Culture from this perspective is not just about groups of people—the Japanese, the Americans, the whites, the Latinx Americans, the working class (although it can be; see Heine, 2015). Rather, the focus is on how the implicit and explicit patterns of ideas, institutions, practices, and artifacts that make

up culture shape behavior, and, in turn, how people's actions reinforce or disrupt these patterns.

Just as the psychological is cultural, *the cultural is also psychological.* Sociocultural contexts do not exist apart from people. Most aspects of sociocultural environments are the products of human agency. They are repositories of previous psychological activity, the psychological externalized or made objective in the world. Institutional structures and their products have intellectual history and shared theories and beliefs built right into them. And, in turn, these sociocultural contexts afford future psychological activity. Humans are *Homo sapiens,* those who make sense or meaning, and are also *Homo faber,* those who make or create. Indeed, the fact that humans make the cultures that influence them is a major evolutionary advantage (Henrich, 2015; Mesoudi, 2009; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). Culture thus exists both "in the head" and "in the world," which means that culture interacts not only with the psychological via the "heads" of people engaging in a particular context, but also via the material "worlds" that people inhabit (Shore, 1996).

A brief answer to the question "Cultural psychology: what is it?" is "research that examines the ways in which cultures and psychologies make each other up in an ongoing dynamic of mutual constitution" (Adams & Markus, 2004; A. Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Gelfand & Kashima, 2016; Kashima, 2000, 2016; Markus & Kitayama, 2010; Shweder, 1991, 2003; Wertsch & Sammarco, 1985). In the next section, we discuss how to represent and map this cycle of mutual constitution using a schematic or tool that we call "the culture cycle."

Mapping Mutual Constitution: The Culture Cycle

Figure 1.2 represents culture as a system of four interacting layers that fit together into a dynamic called "the culture cycle" (A. Fiske et al., 1998; Markus & Conner, 2014; Markus & Kitayama, 2010; Markus, 2017b). Culture includes the *ideas, institutions,* and *interactions* that guide *individuals'* thoughts, feelings, and actions. This graphic inscribes many of the overlapping ideas of psychology and social psychology's earliest theorists (e.g., Asch, 1952; Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Bruner, 1990; James, 1890; Lewin, 1948; Mead, 1934; Moscovici, 1988; Wundt, 1916), as well as those of cultural psychology's early theorists (e.g., Azuma, 1984; Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; M. Cole, 1996; Cross & Madson, 1997; A. Fiske et al., 1998; Gelfand, Triandis, & Chan, 1996; Greenfield & Cocking, 1994; Heine & Lehman, 1997; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Hong, Morris, Chui, & Benet-Martinez, 2000; Kashima et al., 1995; Luria, 1981; Miller, 1984; Matsumoto, 1990; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Miller, 1999; Morris & Peng, 1994; Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Oyserman & Markus, 1993; Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, Fryberg, Brosh, & Hart-Johnson, 2003; Rogoff, 1991; Shweder, 1991, 2003; Shweder & LeVine, 1984; Smith & Bond, 1998; Triandis, 1989; Vygotsky, 1978). For example, the depiction of the individual as an embedded part of the culture cycle heeds Bruner's (1990) admonition that it is impossible to "construct a human psychology on the basis of the individual alone" (p. 12). It also incorporates Gelfand and Kashima's (2016) claim that "culture is central to human sociality" (p. iv). Most significantly, with the depiction of interacting layers that influence each other, it represents Shweder's (1991) view of the mutual constitution of culture and psyche that "culture and psyche make each other up" (p. 24).

Analytically, the culture cycle starts from either the left-hand or the right-hand side. From the left, the ideas, institutions, and interactions of an individual's mix of cultures shapes the "I," so that a person thinks, feels, and acts in ways that reflect and perpetuate these cultures. From the right side, I's (i.e., individuals, selves, minds) create (i.e., reinforce, resist, change) cultures to which other people adapt. The "individuals level" is the usual focus of psychologists and includes thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, feelings, emotions, biases, motives, goals, identities, and self-concepts.

The "interactions level" is the part of the culture cycle in which most people live their lives. As people interact with other people and with human-made products (artifacts), their ways of life manifest in everyday situations that follow seldom-spoken norms



FIGURE 1.2. The culture cycle. Adapted from Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, and Nisbett (1998), Markus and Conner (2014), and Markus and Kitayama (2010).

about the right ways to behave at home, school, work, worship, and play (Gelfand et al., 2011; Kashima, 2014, 2016; Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997; Rogoff, 2016). Guiding these practices are the everyday cultural products—stories, songs, advertisements, social media, tools (e.g., phones, laptops), architecture, and so forth—that make some ways to think, feel, and act easier, more fluid, or better supported by the world a person inhabits than others.

The next layer of culture is made up of the "institutions level," within which everyday interactions take place. Institutions spell out and formalize the roles for a society and include government, religious, legal, economic, educational, and scientific institutions. As an example, economic institutions (e.g., capitalism, socialism), and their associated structures and policies about the distribution of material resources, are particularly significant. For the most part, people are unaware of all the laws and policies at play currently or historically in their cultures. Yet institutions exert a formidable force by providing incentives that foster certain practices and inhibit others (Markus & Conner, 2014; Tankard & Paluck, 2017; Yamagishi & Hashimoto, 2016).

The last and most abstract layer of the culture cycle is the "ideas level," and it is made up of the pervasive, often invisible, historically derived and collectively held ideologies, beliefs, and values about what is good, right, moral, natural, powerful, real, and necessary that inform institutions, interactions, and ultimately, the I's. Because of them, cultures can appear to have overarching themes or patterns that persist, to some extent, across time. To be sure, cultures harbor multiple exceptions to their own foundational rules and values. But they also contain general patterns that can be detected, studied, and even changed (Markus & Conner, 2014).

Several features of the culture cycle approach are especially relevant to its application: (1) The individual is a part of culture rather than an entity separate from it; (2) all four levels are important in shaping behavior, and none is assumed to be more important or theoretically prior to the others; (3) cultures are always dynamic, never static; all levels continually influence each other, and a change at any one level can produce changes in other levels; (4) the culture cycle includes structures and structural dynamics within the cycle and does not separate the cultural from the structural, and structures go hand in hand with meaning systems that animate them and help them exert their influence; (5) the four layers of the culture cycle may be in alignment and support one another or they may be misaligned and in tension; (6) within individuals, depicted here by a head with a gear, are multiple interlocking physiological and genetic systems; and (7) culture cycles are embedded in ecological systems, and all of the systems—within the individual and without—are coevolving.

Being a Person Is a Cultural Project

The Me in the Middle

What is a psychologist to do with culture cycles? Quadrupling the size of the field—adding interactions, institutions, and ideas to the already overly complex terrain of individuals—can seem daunting at best. The invitation here is not for psychologists also to become sociologists, anthropologists, economists, political scientists, historians, and biologists (although we are not discouraging that!). The goal for psychologists, regardless of their particular process or dependent variable of interest, is to widen their analytical angle as they work to conceptualize, theorize, explain, predict, or change people's behavior.

For the most part, psychologists seek the sources of behavior inside the brain and body of the person. A sociocultural perspective encourages looking at a much wider arc of influences on the individual (e.g., Luria, 1981). As the definitions of culture discussed previously reveal, complex and continually evolving cultural patterns of all types provide frameworks for agency or for individuals' thinking, feeling, and acting. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973) wrote that an important starting point in understanding behavior is "to figure out what the devil [people] think they are up to" (p. 29). This is the question of agency. Everyone is agentic, but just what they understand themselves to be doing and what motivates them to act can vary dramatically by context (Markus, 2016).

From the perspective of psychology, one of the most important functions of cultures is to provide guidance for what the individual should be doing and how to be a person. As shown in Figure 1.2, what it means to be an individual or a self—that is, how people in different cultures tend to answer life's essential "Who am I?" and "What am I doing/should I be doing?" questions—are among the big ideas that animate culture cycles. A self is the "me" and the "I" at the center of a person's experiences and is the referent for agency. This self mediates and regulates behavior by coordinating and integrating cognitive, affective, and motivational activity (Markus & Nurius, 1986; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Oyserman, 2007, 2015; Oyserman & Markus, 1993). The self also provides a coordinating framework for brain functioning (Han & Humphreys, 2016; Ma et al., 2012; Varnum, Shi, Chen, Qui, & Han, 2014; Zhu, Zhang, Fan, & Han, 2007; see also Kitayama, Varnum, & Salvador, Chapter 3, this volume). Grounded in culture-specific ideas about how to be a normatively appropriate person, the self directs, weaves together, and lends coherence to attention, perceptions, feelings, memories, hopes, fears, expectations, and goals. A self is a repository or system of many selves (also called "identities"), some of which are more chronically active and others of which are cued and activated by the situation. Considering the potential meanings and relevance of any stimulus or task to the "me" is a useful starting point when making sense of individuals' behavior, or for conceptualizing how to redirect or change behavior (Wilson, 2011).

Recent studies provide strong support for the powerful impact of how people construe themselves and their actions (i.e., their implicit theories, mindsets, schemas) on their motivation, performance, and physiology. People who construe their abilities as malleable and capable of cultivation (i.e., who have a growth mindset), for example, perform better than those who construe their abilities as stable and something that they

are born with (i.e., who have a fixed mindset; Dweck, 2006; Yeager et al., 2016). Students who are the first in their families to attend college, and who learn how to construe their working-class backgrounds as a resource for negotiating the world, perform better than those without this lay theory (Stephens, Hamedani, & Destin, 2014). And people who construe their stress as an opportunity for growth outperform, and show more optimal physiological responding, than those who view their stress as deleterious to their health (Crum, Akinola, Martin, & Fath, 2017; Crum, Salovey, & Achor, 2013).

When self-construals are widely shared and inscribed—that is, reflected and promoted across the ideas, institutions, and interactions of various culture cycles—they can be called intersubjective schemas, cultural schemas, cultural models, or social orientations (D'Andrade, 1984; Holland & Quinn, 1987; Lamont, Adler, Park, & Xiang, 2017). These collective mindsets play a significant role in how people understand themselves and one another, and how they coordinate their behavior. They function by providing blueprints for how to think, feel, and act in the world, and often result in different ways of living and being a person, also called "selfways," "folkways," or "lifeways" in the literature (Markus, Mullally, & Kitayama, 1997; Rogoff, 2016; Sumner, 1906; Adams, Estrada-Villata & Ordóñez, 2018).

Two Normative Ways of Being a Self: My Way and the Right Way

Among the many different ways people can construe themselves, cultural psychological research provides consistent evidence for at least two shared, influential, and widely practiced types of self-construals or social orientations. In a given situation or across situations, people can perceive and understand themselves to be separate from and *independent from others* or they can perceive and understand themselves as connected to and *interdependent with others* (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010; see Figure 1.3). How these two construals are realized, and the relative balance between the two in a given culture, can vary dramatically depending on a wide range of contextual factors, including the ecology, historical period, economic system, philosophical and religious orientation, and rate of social change (in this volume, see Keller, Chapter 15; Talhelm & Oishi, Chapter 4; A. Cohen & Neuberg, Chapter 32). An independent model of the self is more prominent and normative in the West, whereas an interdependent model of the self is more prominent and normative in non-Western cultures that characterize the majority of the world (Adams, 2005; Gelfand & Kashima, 2016; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Kitayama & Cohen, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2003, 2010; Kitayama, Duffy, & Uchida, 2007; see Figure 1.3).

In many Eastern cultural contexts, for example, national and regional culture cycles



FIGURE 1.3. Interdependent and independent selves. Adapted from Heine (2015), Markus and Conner (2014), and Markus and Kitayama (1991, 2010).

contain a confluence of multiple historically derived ideas, philosophies, religious institutions, and daily practices that promote a way of being and construal of the self as a connected, relational individual—as *interdependent*. In many Western cultural contexts, in contrast, a different set of national and regional culture cycles promote a way of being and construal of the self as a separate, bounded, autonomous individual—as *independent*. Engaging in culture cycles is the basic, active, and constant process of human life that transforms the biological being into an individual.

With an independent self comes an *independent style of agency* or acting in the world (i.e., "my way" agency). The emphasis is on being a unique, separate individual, expressing the self and influencing others and the world, being free from constraints as well as free to choose, and being equal to others—represented by the shaded area in the independent self in Figure 1.3 (Heine, 2015; Markus & Conner, 2014; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010). When an independent way of being is guiding behavior, personal preferences, feelings, attitudes, mindsets, individual goals, and feelings about the self (e.g., a sense of control, self-esteem, self-confidence) influence and drive behavior. These internal characteristics have behavioral force; they are the source of agency.

For example, in cultural contexts that emphasize independence, a person's attitudes, feelings, and preferences guide behavior (Riemer et al., 2014). Attitudes toward the environment predict ecologically conscious behavior (Eom, Kim, Sherman, & Ishii, 2016), negative feelings predict poor physical and mental health (Curhan, Sims, et al., 2014b; Kitayama et al., 2015; Kitayama, Varnum, & Salvador, Chapter 3, this volume; Miyamoto et al., 2013; Miyamoto, Yoo, & Wilken, Chapter 12, this volume), and personal preferences motivate which spouses, jobs, and products people choose (Chen, Austin, Miller, & Piercy, 2015; Guan et al., 2015; Savani, Markus, & Conner, 2008; Savani, Morris, & Naidu, 2012; Shavitt, Cho, & Barnes, Chapter 25, this volume). In these contexts, affirming the independent self improves performance (Covarrubias, Hermann, & Fryberg, 2016), and commitment to individual goals maintains motivation (Kizilcec & Cohen, 2017). Focusing on others—more common in interdependent contexts—can actually undermine motivation and performance (Fu & Markus, 2014; Hamedani, Markus, & Fu, 2013). The source of agency from an independent perspective is experienced as coming from *inside* the individual (Plaut & Markus, 2005), and good or normative behavior is self-regulated behavior. In these contexts, *subjectivity* or what an individual personally expects, believes, thinks, feels, and wants, is the primary driver of behavior.

With an interdependent self comes an *interdependent style of agency* or acting in the world (i.e., "the right way" or normatively appropriate agency). Here, the focus is on relationships, referencing and communicating with ingroup others, similarity to others, adjusting to situations, following norms, being rooted in traditions, meeting obligations, and being ranked in hierarchy—represented by the dotted lines in the interdependent self in Figure 1.3 (Kim & Lawrie, Chapter 10, this volume; Heine, 2015; Markus & Conner, 2014; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010; Rai & A. Fiske, 2011). When an interdependent way of being is guiding behavior, relationships, others and their expectations, obligations, duties, roles, responsibilities, and norms (i.e., shared or common sense about how to behave) influence and drive a person's behavior. Connections and commitments to others, as well as what others think, expect, or require, have behavioral force; they are the source of agency. In situations where there is relatively greater focus on other-regulation as opposed to self-regulation, subjectivity may exert less behavioral force, and individuals can be relieved of some burdens of individual choice and control. The solid line circumscribing the selves and others in the depiction of interdependent selves (See Figure 1.3) represents a boundary between the ingroup (i.e., those with whom the self is interdependent) and outgoups (i.e., those with whom the self is not considered to be interdependent). This ingroup/outgroup boundary is much less marked and observed in independent contexts that prescribe unconstrained interaction among free and equal individuals.

Recent research also shows that in cultural contexts emphasizing interdependence, emotional experience depends more on others than on the self (Masuda, Gonzalez,

Kwan, & Nisbett, 2008; Uchida, Townsend, & Markus, 2009); marriage and employment decisions depend on important others (Chen et al., 2015; Guan et al., 2015; Savani, Markus, Naidu, Kumar, & Berlia, 2010); peer endorsements predict product choices (Savani et al., 2008; Sia et al, 2009); and close and important others motivate behavior (Covarrubias et al., 2016; Lamm et al. 2017; Sims et al., 2018; Stephens, Fryberg, Markus, Johnson, & Covarrubias, 2012; Torelli, Leslie, Stoner & Puente, 2014; Tripathi, Cervone, & Savani, 2018). Furthermore, people accommodate requests, exhibit more patience, and give to others without concern for reciprocity (Miller et al., 2014; Perlow & Weeks, 2002; Savani, Morris, Naidu, Kumar, & Berlia, 2011); have more socially oriented memories (Q. Wang, 2016); attend more to the social context in judging emotions (Masuda et al., 2008, Masuda, Russell, Li, & Lee, Chapter 8, this volume); and give more Facebook likes and fewer status updates (S. Hong & Na, 2017). Further, among people who hold a more interdependent model of self, cross-situational inconsistency is often less predictive of well-being (Church et al., 2014; Cross, Gore, & Morris, 2003; Diener & Suh, 2002), behavior that is inconsistent with personal preferences is more common (Savani, Markus, & Conner, 2008) and does not arouse as much cognitive dissonance (Heine & Lehman, 1997; Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005; Kitayama et al., 2004), and failing to practice what one preaches receives less moral condemnation (Effron, Markus, Jackman, Muramoto, & Muluk, 2018).

The source of agency from an interdependent perspective is experienced as coming from *outside* the individual (Plaut & Markus, 2005; Markus, 2016), and good or normative behavior is very often other-regulated behavior that is responsive to expectations and obligations. In these contexts, "connectivity," or how a person is related to and linked with others is the primary driver of behavior. Another type of evidence supporting interdependent agency or the significance of others in shaping behavior comes from recent research demonstrating how cultural norms—what other people think, feel, or do in a given context—explains and powers behavior in multiple domains and circumstances (Gelfand et al., 2011; Harrington & Gelfand, 2014; Riemer, Shavitt, Koo, & Markus, 2014). Good or normative behavior is more other-regulated as compared to self-regulated. Agency is thus less locked within the individual, more interpersonal, and relatively objective (i.e., there is more emphasis on what others think and feel; Tsai & Clobert, Chapter 11, this volume).

As the culture cycle approach depicts, differences in agency and its associated psychological tendencies are responses or adaptations to particular sociocultural requirements. These patterns shape how actions can be regulated and whether agency is experienced as primarily internal and self-regulated or as external and other-regulated (Adams, Bruckmüller, & Decker, 2012; Carey & Markus, 2016; Kitayama et al., 1997; Kitayama, Duffy, & Uchida, 2007). Interdependent ways of being, either chronic or activated, are associated with relatively tight connections among people, producing a social order in which cooperation (and sometimes competition) is promoted and protection from threat is assured, but one in which breaking or ending connections is relatively difficult (Carey & Markus, 2017; Kim, Sherman, & Updegraff, 2016; Morris, Hong, Chiu, & Liu, 2015b; Kitayama et al., 2007; Yamagishi & Hashimoto, 2016; Yuki & Schug, 2012). Independent ways of being are more often associated with more material resources and looser connections among people, giving rise to a social landscape in which people have the opportunity to choose according to their preferences (e.g., Adams et al., 2012; Stephens, Markus, & Phillips, 2014), and, in fact, must self-promote and develop internal traits because they are less assured of ingroup protection (Yamagishi & Hashimoto, 2016).

Notably, these two styles of agency can also be activated in individuals by situationally prompting them to construe themselves as either independent or interdependent in the moment (e.g., Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; see also Greenfield, 2009; Heine, 2015; Keller & Bard, 2017; Markus & Conner, 2014; Mesquita, De Leersnyder, & Albert, 2014; Oyserman & Yan, Chapter 20, this volume). The question of whether the "me" is independent or interdependent, that is, operating as an "I" or as a "we" in a given context or situation, seems to be a universal existential theme (Keller & Kärtner, 2013; Shweder & Bourne, 1984) and many people have some experience with both of these styles of agency.

The evidence for these conclusions is robust and growing. Most of it is from comparisons between Western contexts (North American and European cultural contexts) in which an independent style of agency is familiar and practiced, and Eastern contexts (East and South Asian cultural contexts) in which an interdependent style of agency is more familiar and practiced. Researchers have also looked at interdependent agency in Middle Eastern and African contexts (Dzokoto, 2010; Uskul, Cross, Günsoy, & Gul, Chapter 30, this volume; Uskul, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2008). Recently studies have also examined agency in U.S. working-class and Latinx, Native American, and African American contexts, in which an interdependent style of agency is practiced and familiar (sometimes right alongside an independent style of agency; Brannon, Markus, & Taylor, 2015; Fryberg, Covarrubias, & Burack, 2013; Holloway, Waldrip, & Ickes, 2009; Kraus, Callaghan, & Ondish, Chapter 27, this volume; Ramírez-Esparza, Chung, Sierra-Otero, & Pennebaker, 2012; Stephens, Markus, & Townsend, 2007). Together, these studies are beginning to reveal with more detail and precision some of the sources and mechanisms of interdependent agency.

At least three crosscutting understandings emerge from research on culture and agency. First, interdependent agency does not involve a grudging attention to others, role prescriptions, or norms. Instead, people actively seek to behave so as to be part of relationships or larger wholes, and so attune themselves to situations and patterns of interaction that require this behavior, often effortlessly and without awareness. Second, independent agency also involves conforming to norms and other-regulation; the difference is that the norm is "not to follow the norm" and to do things "my way." One consequence of independent agency, for laypeople and scientists alike, is that the role of sociocultural norms becomes hard to track and often seems to disappear altogether. Third, given psychology's near exclusive emphasis on independent agency, many everyday forms of interdependent agency have yet to be examined as sources of agency themselves. With the exception of research on honor (i.e., one's reputation in the eyes of others; Cross et al., 2014; Leung & Cohen, 2011; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Uskul et al., Chapter 30, this volume), they include loyalty, solidarity, obligation, duty, sacrifice, hierarchy (vs. equality), roles, responsibilities, other-regulation (vs. self-regulation), and normative- or authority-driven behavior (Markus, 2016).

WHAT CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGISTS KNOW ABOUT PERSONS AND CULTURES

In the decade since the publication of the first *Handbook of Cultural Psychology* (Kitayama & Cohen, 2007), thousands of studies in all areas of psychology have examined the ways in which culture shapes behavior. Across these studies, in multiple cultural contexts with an array of methods, several crosscutting, high-level generalizations are emerging about people and about cultures. Before reviewing a selection of recent findings and theories in more detail, we describe five of these generalizations in the following sections: (1) people are different—some are WEIRD, but most are not; (2) cultures "R" us, not overlays or lenses; (3) everyone is multicultural and intersectional—it's complicated; (4) some cultures are more equal than others—how difference becomes inferiority; and (5) it's cultural—of fits and clashes.

People Are Different–Some Are WEIRD, but Most Are Not

One of the field's major achievements has been to raise awareness among psychologists that most existing scholarship is based on studies of middle-class people in the West, carried out by middle-class researchers in the West. Arnett (2008) argued that we have focused far too narrowly on U.S. Americans, who only comprise about 5% of the world's population, and have neglected the other 95%. Given this research bias, he asks whether psychology can truly consider itself to be a science of *human* behavior. He notes that most people in the world live in strenuous, under-resourced circumstances, and that the main social unit in these contexts is large, multigenerational families that pro-

more interdependence, obligation, and mutual support. As a consequence, many psychological findings and generalizations from the middle-class West are likely to be a poor fit at best for most of the world's people (see also Brady, Fryberg, & Shoda, 2018; Greenfield, 2017; Greenfield et al., 2006; Miller, 1999; Rogoff, 2003).

The economist–social psychologist team of Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan ratcheted up the significance of this problem with the observation that the 15% of the world's population that psychology understands best, is, in fact, WEIRD: an acronym that stands for Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (Henrich et al., 2010). Moreover, WEIRD is not just an acronym. The West is actually historically, economically, and geographically odd compared to much of the world's population. This means that the relatively well-resourced culture cycles of the middle-class West that shape people with independent selves and an independent style of agency operate with very different ideas, institutions, and interactions.

These WEIRD culture cycles are saturated with ideas about the natural rights of free and equal individuals, institutions like the legal system that support and formalize these ideas, and interactions are organized by social networks built around single-generation families with few children. In these WEIRD culture cycles, people spend more time alone and are encouraged to focus on themselves, making choices based on their preferences, expressing their emotions and opinions, following their own unique paths, and charting their futures. These are the so called "basic" humans that psychologists know best. Perhaps the most significant contribution of cultural psychology's comparative approach in the last decade has been to shine a bright light on middle-class, Western cultural contexts and to see them as particular ways of living that give rise to particular ways of being. Many phenomena and processes long considered to be the result of the unfolding of universal human nature may now be examined for the ways in which they are actually culturally constructed and maintained. Qi Wang (2016) advises that incorporating cultural psychology into research programs is feasible and necessary, and that *all* psychologists should be *cultural* psychologists.

Cultures "R" Us, Not Overlays or Lenses

More than two decades ago, Shweder and colleagues (1997), in a chapter with the subtitle "One Mind, Many Mentalities," wrote "that the wager of cultural psychology is that relatively few components of the human mental equipment are so inherent, hard wired, or fundamental that their developmental pathway is fixed in advance and cannot be altered through cultural participation" (p. 867). That wager has paid off. Participating in communities and engaging with particular sets of ideas, frames, schemas, or mindsets can alter how and what people see, desire, feel, think, and act; how they learn and how they perform; and even how they respond physiologically (Kitayama et al., Chapter 3, this volume). Revealing when, why, how, and to what extent it happens is now the charge of cultural psychology.

The empirical examples in Figure 1.1 shine a bright light on what a careful consideration and interrogation of cultural ideas and practices can contribute to our understanding of human psychological functioning, as well as the many challenges and research opportunities that are ahead for a sociocultural grounded psychology. In Lamm and colleagues' (2017) study, children are given Walter Mischel's classic "marshmallow test," in which an adult tells a child that if she does not eat the marshmallow in front of the adult right now, she may have a second one if she waits until an adult comes back into the room. Many Western lay observers and psychologists alike assume that 4-year-olds facing the prospect of a delicious treat (a marshmallow in the Global North or an equally appealing alternative sweet in the Global South) will "naturally" struggle to fight their desire and the temptation of consuming it immediately.

In reality, an independent model of agency underlies the assumption that people are driven to express their individual needs and preferences and can suffer negative consequences if constrained from doing so. Waiting is the opposite of freely exercising one's own preferences—thus, the struggle of whether to eat the marshmallow immediately or wait and postpone gratification to obtain a second treat. Some German children manage to resist. To distract themselves, they move, twist, whine, hum, and make desperate, unhappy faces. Nearly twice as many Nso children in rural Cameroon, on the other hand, wait for the second treat. As these children supposedly "resist" the temptation to eat the first marshmallow, they do not manifest the same signs of "struggle" as the German children do.

Cameroonian and German culture cycles provide insights into why these children behaved differently. In Cameroon, one prevalent cultural idea is that an individual is a part of an encompassing social whole, and the overarching goal that guides a person's behavior is to figure out how to fit within this whole and adjust to it. As interdependent agents with interdependent selves, people live in intergenerational extended families and are used to adjusting to others. At the interactions level of the culture cycle, parenting practices emphasize awareness of one's place in the social hierarchy and respecting elders. In contrast, German culture cycles foster independent agency and an independent self. Parenting practices instead stress developing personal interests and expressing individual preferences and emotions. When one compares these two culture cycles and their underlying models of agency, one can see that the appeal of a sweet may be universal, but the behavioral course and outcome of this appeal is quite different.

This fascinating study opens the door to many lines of inquiry. Will the children who can delay gratification show more achievement in later life as they do in the United States (Mischel, 2014)? Do children in Germany and Cameroon experience the situation similarly? If not, what do they experience and why? How do parents structure interactions to foster these different styles of regulation and associated ways of being? Is it the case that the Nso children reveal no negative affect, or do they learn effective strategies of down-regulation? For example, analyzing East Asian contexts, Tsai and colleagues propose that calm affect is highly functional, in that it allows people to attend to and adjust to others, which is useful for interdependent selves and agents (Tsai, 2017; Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006). How are such differences in arousal socialized and maintained (Tsai & Clobert, Chapter 11, this volume)? What does variability in arousal or other aspects of emotional experience (e.g., degree of embodiment, social sharing of emotion, emotional practices) mean for the conceptualization of "basic" human emotions (Mesquita & Barrett, 2017)? What are productive and innovative methods for answering these types of questions?

Psychology is the science of the minds, brains, and behavior of individuals, but what the evidence now underscores is that these minds, brains, and individuals are always in situations and cultures, and are responsive to them. The strong implication is (1) that minds, brains, people, and their situations are best conceptualized and theorized together, and (2) that minds, brains, and people are more malleable and flexible than psychologists have previously realized. Patterns of activity that are observed in behavior and in the brain are made up of, and are made up by, the sociocultural. The sociocultural, then, is not an overlay on the basic that can be peeled back to reveal the underlying "really real."

Psychology's focus on people in WEIRD cultural contexts has led to an essentialist perspective that focuses on people's internality, locates the sources of action inside the person, and conceptualizes psychological functioning as basic and discrete psychological processes (e.g., attention, perception, cognition, emotion, motivation). A cultural perspective may eventually lead to a psychology that instead focuses more on shared and contextualized human activities (Rozin, 2001), including eating (Rozin, Ruby, & Cohen, Chapter 17, this volume), attachment (Keller, 2016; Keller, Chapter 15, this volume), learning (Rogoff, 2016), working (Levine, Harrington, & Uhlmann, Chapter 23, this volume), relating (Kim & Lawrie, Chapter 10, this volume), communicating (Keller, Chapter 15, this volume), consuming (Shavitt, Cho, & Barnes, Chapter 25, this volume), being well (Miyamoto, Yoo, & Wilken, Chapter 12, this volume), fitting in and acculturating (Mesquita, De Leersnyder, & Jasini, Chapter 19, and Morris, Fincher, & Savani, Chapter 18, this volume), and more, most of which have connecting or relating to others and the social world as key features (Adams, Estrada-Villata, & Kurtis, 2018).

Everyone Is Multicultural and Intersectional–It's Complicated

Navigating the norms and demands of two or more nations, regions, races, or ethnic groups—many of them at odds with one another—is a formidable challenge for people across the globe (Benet-Martínez & Hong, 2014; Leung & Koh, Chapter 21, and Mesquita et al., Chapter 19, this volume). As people encounter each other in bedrooms, classrooms, courtrooms, and boardrooms, it is important that they recognize and reject what Morris and colleagues call culturalism: "a categorical conception in which individuals are shaped by one primary culture and the world's cultural traditions are separate and independent" (Morris et al., 2015a, p. 633). As popular and scientific attention focuses on culture beyond nations or regions, and the scope of cultural analysis expands to consider the many cultures of people's lives, it may become easier to fight culturalism and see the fact that people are all multicultural in one way or another. All people participate in many culture cycles simultaneously, and all lives contain a variety of cultural intersections (A. Cohen, 2009; A. Cohen & Varnum, 2016; Markus & Conner, 2014). As a sociocultural perspective grows in prominence, it may become more obvious and possibly easier to reject color blindness, an ideology that claims that culture, race, ethnicity, as well as gender and other significant social distinctions, should not be major factors that shape the experiences and outcomes of people's lives. Currently, color blindness is still a powerful ideology in places such as the United States, bringing with it neglect or even denial of the fact that social categorizations fundamentally organize society and have life-altering consequences (e.g., Markus & Moya, 2010; Omi & Winant, 1986/2015; Plaut, 2010).

From a cultural psychological perspective, people can be characterized as nodes in multiple intersecting, open, and constantly shifting culture cycles. As an example, many people in U.S. national contexts are often goal-directed, focused on self-promotion and expressiveness, and have a sense of self that is highly independent compared to people in East Asian national contexts. Yet, as U.S. national culture cycles intersect with U.S. social class culture cycles, the characterization of U.S. psychological tendencies may change markedly. In contexts characterized by fewer economic resources, less status, and lower societal rank, people need to depend on, rely on, and fit in with others who can help buffer the constraints of riskier worlds (S. Fiske & Markus, 2012; Markus & Stephens, 2017; Kraus, Callaghan, & Ondish, Chapter 27, this volume). As they participate in smaller, tighter social networks with scarcer resources, working-class U.S. Americans are more likely to emphasize cooperation and protection from threat, have more contextual/holistic ways of understanding the world, and focus on referencing others, maintaining ties, and adjusting to others compared to middle-class Americans. While middle-class and working-class culture cycles in the United States are both likely to foster independence and the importance of hard work and personal responsibility through shared American ideas and institutions (Carey & Markus, 2016; Stephens, Markus & Phillips, 2014), their culture cycles can diverge markedly at the level of everyday interactions and their interrelated individual psychological tendencies (Markus, 2017). In contrast, middle- and upper-class U.S. individuals have the often unseen advantage of having access to more material and social resources to realize prevalent cultural mandates like those reflected in the American Dream.

As Japanese national culture cycles intersect with Japanese social class culture cycles, the outcomes are both similar and different than the U.S. case. Miyamoto and colleagues (2018) found that in Japan, higher SES is associated with higher self-oriented psychological traits and socialization values, as they are in the United States. Yet, notably, this self-orientation does not come at the expense of other orientation. Higher SES is also associated with higher other-oriented psychological traits and socialization values. In Japan, it is those in higher SES contexts who face the multitasking challenge of pursuing their own goals while also fulfilling the social responsibilities that are foundational to competent personhood in Japanese and other East Asian culture cycles.

One of the obvious challenges of multicultural, intersectional selves is that of concatenating complexity. Theoretically, all

significant social categories are meaningful and can powerfully shape psychological experience, but what is one to do in the analytic moment? Addressing this "All of us are multicultural" point, Markus and Conner (2014) analyzed eight cultural divides that have been reasonably well studied in the social sciences, and that have been shown to be consequential for people's answers to the universal "Who am I/who are we" questions of identity and belonging: East versus West, Global North versus Global South, men versus women, rich versus poor, whites versus people of color, businesses versus governments and nonprofits, liberal versus conservative religious groups, and coasts versus heartlands. They show that one set of culture cycles (i.e., those of the West, the Global North, men, the rich or middle-class, whites, businesses, liberal religious groups, and the coasts), tend to promote independence, while the culture cycles of the less well-resourced and less powerful sides of these divides tend to promote interdependence. Markus and Conner propose that any given person's social orientation toward independence or interdependence will depend on that person's mix of these culture cycles and on which ones are salient at a given time or situation. Given the hegemony of independence in American ideas and institutions, along with the historical dominance of color blindness, the interdependent tendencies that arise from intersections of national culture with social class, race and ethnicity, and gender may go unrecognized and are often misunderstood and stigmatized.

The most well-developed theorizing on intersectionality focuses on the interplay of race and gender identities. It proposes that the many factors that contribute to one's identity should not be considered separately, but instead, simultaneously and as interacting to influence one's privilege and treatment in society (E. Cole, 2009; Crenshaw, 1989; Goff & Kahn, 2013; E. Hall, Galinsky, & Phillips, 2015; Settles & Buchanan, 2014). These researchers have been most concerned with the power and social justice implications of intersectionality, especially in law, the workplace, and education. Researchers studying multiculturalism in cultural psychology have instead focused primarily on the psychological experience of having multiple identities and their behavioral consequences (Benet-Martinez & Hong, 2014). These two literatures are highly relevant for each other but have yet to intersect.

Some Cultures Are More Equal Than Others–How Difference Becomes Inferiority

In the course of expanding the scope of cultural comparison and revealing different and previously unexamined ways of living and ways of being, one fact is in high relief. Some cultures are more equal than others. There is a clear power hierarchy among cultures. One project of cultural psychology is to compare cultures' different ways of living and being, and to test the hypothesis that there is more than one good and viable way of living and being (e.g., what looks like conformity and a failure to express oneself from a Western perspective is adjusting in the service of group harmony from an Eastern perspective; Kim & Markus, 1999). This task is challenging enough. Yet dramatically complicating the cultural comparison process is that, across most cultural divides, the cultures being compared should not be arrayed horizontally, side by side, but rather vertically, because one has more material resources, power, and status than the other (e.g., the Global North vs. the Global South, the middle class vs. the working class, men vs. women, whites vs. African Americans).

It is easy to fall into the trap of culturalism (Morris et al., 2015a) and assume that the cultures on either side of a divide are separate from each other, and that their cultural patterns reflect only their own valued, self-sustaining ideas and practices. This way of conceptualizing culture ignores the fact that the observed cultural patterns of the less powerful group are, in some significant part, a function of contending with the imposition of the more powerful culture's ideas and practices (Markus, 2008). When what the less powerful group does is shown to be less efficient, competent, or healthy (often according to the metrics and measurement instruments devised by the more powerful group), the assumption may be that the less powerful group is different because its members' ways of living and being are somehow inferior or faulty (Moya & Markus, 2010).

Further, these power and resource differences among cultures have real and significant consequences, and serve to maintain the dominance of the more powerful group. (See, for example, the recent headline-grabbing fight over whether women in Silicon Valley are biologically or culturally unfit to be coders and engineers as a way to explain their dramatic underrepresentation in these careers.) As such, cultural differences come to be constructed not simply as differences, but as indications of the "inferiority" of the less powerful group (Adams & Estrada-Villalta, 2017, Croizet, 2012).

The task for cultural psychologists, then, is to consider not only the mutual constitution of culture and psyche, but also what is more properly called "downward constitution": the experience of being in a setting in which "one is exposed to a potentially limiting and devaluing concert of representations, historical narratives, possible judgments, treatments, interactions, expectations, and affective reactions" (Thomas, 1992, as paraphrased in Markus, Steele, & Steele, 2000, p. 235). Some of the observed practices and tendencies of a given sociocultural context under study are claimed and valued by participants in that context, while others may be imposed and unclaimed and thus resisted and challenged. Observed psychological tendencies can reflect adaptation to one, both, or a blend of incorporation or resistance. The analysis of how cultures and psyches make each other up also requires an understanding and an explanation of downward social constitution within its cycles (see Figure 1.4 for an example of the downward constitution of African Americans in the U.S.).



FIGURE 1.4. Downward constitution.

A cultural analysis that incorporates downward constitution should include an awareness of (1) historically derived *ideas* about group differences (e.g., black = criminal, Latinx = illegal); (2) the role of current or past *institutions* in how policies and structures formalize difference, as well as inscribe and maintain a particular social ordering (e.g., slavery, immigration policy); (3) the role of *interactions* in perpetuating norms that guide behavior (e.g., who plays with whom, who dates whom), the actions of other people (e.g., being followed in a department store, being handcuffed without cause during a traffic stop by the police), and the expectations of others (e.g., employers' and teachers' views about who is smart and capable or who is likely to be a troublemaker in the classroom or on the street); and (4) at the level of *individuals*, people's experiences of difference (e.g., stereotype threat, invisibility).

Attending to the dynamics of downward constitution in a cultural analysis importantly directs our attention to the negative, essentializing, and deficiency-focused ideas and actions that powerful groups in society impose on a less powerful groups. Higher ranking groups, compared to lower ranking groups, often adopt more fixed or essentializing beliefs about the sources of identity and behavior of other groups as a way of maintaining their status (Mahalingam, 2003; Moya & Henrich, 2016). A sociocultural approach offers psychologists a view to the historically derived and context-specific processes by which difference becomes inferiority—a view that is hidden by a focus on the individual level alone (Markus & Moya, 2010; for specific examples, see Adams, Estrada-Villalta, & Ordóñez (2018) for a discussion of how the colonial Global North downwardly constitutes the formerly colonized Global South with various forms of so-called cultural "pathologies"; see Shafir (2017) for a discussion of how people in high SES contexts are disdainful of people in low SES contexts and downwardly constitute them through attributions of inferiority, and Goudeau and Croizet (2017) for a discussion of how certain classroom practices such as hand raising advantage middle-class students while disadvantaging working-class students and often go unseen).

It's Cultural–of Fits and Clashes

As societies and the social sciences have grown more diverse in recent years, there has been a corresponding growth in the volume of research on culture clashes or divides. These clashes occur when a person's understanding or way of being in the situation does not match or fit with the ideas and practices that are prevalent in that situation. This can happen when, for instance, a student or an employee feels like she is met with a concert of ideas and practices—large and small—in which she is invisible or rendered as potentially inferior (e.g., Brannon et al., 2015; Fryberg & Townsend, 2008; Lewis & Sekaquaptewa, 2016; Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008; C. Steele, 2010; Walton, Murphy, & Ryan, 2015). One example is when a Latinx lawyer, in the midst of a firm reception or party, is asked, "Where are the drinks?" by a colleague who mistakes her for a server. It can also happen when a familiar and well-practiced way of being (e.g., interdependent agency) meets a set of interactional patterns or institutional polices that have been set up with another way of being in mind (e.g., independent agency; Bencharit et al., 2018; Markus & Conner, 2014; Stephens, Hamedani, Markus, Bergsieker, & Eloul, 2009; Stephens, Townsend, Markus, & Phillips, 2012). One example is when an East Asian middle manager, during performance review time, is told that he does not have the executive presence to move to the C-suites.

The result in both instances is a culture clash or a lack of fit and a sense of dis-ease, difficulty, or discomfort in the person in the clashing or ill-fitting situation. This experience often manifests as a drag on trust, motivation, performance, social interactions, well-being, and even physical health (Fryberg & Martínez, 2014; C. Steele, 2010). Recent examples of the effects of culture clashes include underrepresented or minoritized students in colleges or universities (Yeager et al., 2016), first-generation college students entering institutions of higher education (Harackiewicz et al., 2014; Goudeau & Croizet, 2017; Stephens, Townsend, et al., 2012), immigrants from collectivist societies entering more individualist ones (Cheung, Chudek, & Heine, 2011; De Leersnyder, Mesquita, & Kim, 2011; Sam & Berry,

2010), and women entering male-dominated science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields (Cheryan, Ziegler, Montoya, & Jiant, 2017; Stout, Dasgupta, Hunsinger, & McManus, 2011).

While a culture clash undermines many aspects of behavior, a cultural fit, on the other hand, supports it. Most generally, a fit occurs when one's way of being (i.e., thinking, feeling, behaving) matches or is congruent with the ways that are common and valued in a given context. For example, U.S. Americans who are independent and fit mainstream U.S. cultural norms and Japanese who are interdependent and fit mainstream Japanese cultural norms experience better health outcomes (Levine, Miyamoto, et al., 2016b; Levine, Atkins, Waldfogel, & Chen, 2016a). A culture cycle approach is useful to analyze how to intervene to reduce culture clashes and enhance cultural fit. Some well-researched approaches include creating identity-safe classrooms through the incorporation of multiple cues that signal inclusion (Steele & Cohn-Vargas, 2013), and through buttressing students' sense of belonging by framing adversity as common and transient (Walton & Cohen, 2011).

RECENT EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS AND ADVANCES

Psychologists from all areas of the discipline are beginning to take a sociocultural perspective on their research. Even without the explicit comparison of two or more groups, this perspective can change the questions psychologists ask and the ways they seek to answer them. Both *what* cultural psychology scholars are studying today, as well as *how* they are studying it, reflects a maturing of the field and increasing level of analytical sophistication. Here, we give a targeted overview of cultural scientists' key insights in the decade since the inaugural publication of this volume. These advances demonstrate how the psychological is changing how we think about culture, and how we think about culture is changing how we think about the psychological. They also provide the latest empirical evidence for the cross-cutting generalizations discussed previously: that we are not all WEIRD, that ways of being can take multiple forms, and that cultural fit matters.

Going Deep: Genetics and the Brain

Culture shapes not only psychological processes themselves but also the genetic and neural processes that can underlie what we call "the psychological." Culture is not just the ubiquitous water in which we swim; it also operates under the skin, interacting with our genes and brains at the biological level.

As Kitayama and Uskul (2011) importantly underscore, due to the ways the biological and social sciences were used and abused in the past to justify so-called "scientific" racism, it was considered taboo for some time even to breach the topic of cultural differences mapping onto the physical body in any way. As the science behind gene–environment interaction has grown more sophisticated in recent years, however, the data simply do not show that there is any kind of biologically deterministic relationship between genes and cultures. Instead, what scientists have observed is an intricate and flexible process of social and environmental interaction and adaptation that does not affect the genetic code itself, but instead affects how some genes are expressed under certain conditions. Culture, therefore, may influence genetics in a subtle way (in this volume, see Kim & Lawrie, Chapter 10; Kitayama et al., Chapter 3)—it does not change the basic design of the mind or body itself, but rather specific aspects of psychological or behavioral adaptation to particular environmental factors (Kitayama & Uskul, 2011).

How does this take place? Genes and cultures can influence one another both at the macro-level, through what is called gene–culture coevolution, and at the micro-level, through what is called gene–culture interactions (Henrich, 2015; Kim & Sasaki, 2014; Moya & Henrich, 2016; see also Mesoudi, Chapter 5, this volume). Gene–culture coevolution means that cultural ideas, values, and practices have evolved over time and are adaptive, influence the social and physical environments in which people live, and happen in tandem with the genetic natural selection process. As such, certain genotypes may correspond to particular cultural tendencies or reflect different tendencies in different cultural environments. Gene–culture interactions, on the other hand, mean that culture may interact with people's genetic predispositions to influence how they think, feel, and act, or influence how sensitive particular people are to certain kinds of cultural or environmental experiences (Kim & Sasaki, 2014; Kitayama, King, Hsu, Liberzon, & Yoon, 2016).

What do these interactive processes actually look like? Kitayama and colleagues (2016) recently proposed, for example, that some people may be more genetically sensitive to cultural norms than others, which could help account for individual differences in psychological tendencies within cultural groups. In a study testing this theory, they found that people who carried dopamine receptor gene (*DRD4*) polymorphisms linked to increased dopamine signaling (7- or 2-repeat alleles) were more likely to exhibit culturally dominant social orientations (Kitayama et al., 2014). That is, American-born European Americans with this gene expression were likely to be more independent than their counterparts without the gene expression. Similarly, Asian-born Asians with the same gene expression were likely to be more interdependent than their fellow Asians without the gene expression. This evidence suggests that the *DRD4* could play an important role in cultural learning, accounting for at least some variation in how people acquire, embody, and enact pervasive social norms. It may help explain, for example, why some of us might seem more like prototypical members of our cultures, while others may be more likely to seem like iconoclasts or rebels who more often go against the grain.

Culture also shapes the mind through how people's brains work, both functionally and structurally (Chiao, 2009; Kim & Sasaki, 2014; Kitayama & Uskul, 2011; see also Kitayama et al., Chapter 3, this volume). Early studies in cultural neuroscience, using brain imaging methods such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and event-related potential (ERP), indicated that there are neural correlates to cultural differences typically captured through self-report and behavioral measures. For example, both Chinese and North American college students showed greater MPFC (medial prefrontal cortex) activation when making judgments about themselves compared to others, consistent with prior behavioral research showing differences between East Asians and North Americans in self–other judgments (Zhu et al., 2007). However, only Chinese participants also showed activation in the MPFC when thinking about their mothers, a close other who is likely interdependent with the self. Indeed, as numerous studies have shown, self-construal has been found to be a consistent mediator of cultural differences in brain activity in explaining differences across both national and religious cultures (Han & Humphreys, 2016; Sasaki & Kim, 2011).

Other researchers have examined the effects of cultural priming on brain activity and have studied the neural correlates of cultural differences in cognitive styles, emotion regulation, and social cognition (in this volume, see Masuda, Russell, Li, & Lee, Chapter 8; Tsai & Clobert, Chapter 11). Using fMRI to study cultural differences in holistic versus analytic processing styles, for instance, showed that East Asians and European Americans had to control their attention more when they were asked to adopt the "culturally opposite" processing style when making visual judgments. East Asians exerted greater mental effort (i.e., showed greater frontal and parietal activation) when asked to ignore the context (which contrasts with a holistic processing style), while European Americans showed greater mental effort when asked to pay attention to the context (which contrasts with an analytic processing style; Hedden, Ketay, Aron, Markus, & Gabrieli, 2008). In a study using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNRIS), Murata, Park, Kovelman, Hu, and Kitayama (2015) found similar results using a different method to look at brain activity. As for brain structure itself, early research using MRI has shown that some meaningful cultural differences may also develop in the brain's anatomy, possibly due to the acquisition of different cognitive styles, languages, or self-regulation processes (Sasaki & Kim, 2011; Kitayama et al., 2015). Taken together, this work suggests that the brain is plastic and flexible, responsive to a diversity of cultural inputs and variation.

Spanning Basic Processes: Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation

As showcased in Figure 1.1, culture in all forms shapes the basic psychological pro-

cesses of cognition, emotion, and motivation. Culture facilitates different styles of thinking, feeling, and acting that guide how people understand themselves and others, as well as how they perceive and navigate the world around them.

Cognition

In addition to continuing to document the effects of analytic–holistic cognitive styles and independent–interdependent social orientations on perception, attention, categorization, and reasoning (see Masuda et al., Chapter 8, this volume), researchers are now analyzing how these cultural differences in cognition originate and develop. Some have hypothesized that adapting to different environmental ecologies, in particular, can lead to cultural variation in cognition (see also Talhelm & Oishi, Chapter 4, this volume). As an example, to test whether environments that call for greater social interdependence lead to a more holistic cognitive style, Uskul and colleagues (2008) studied three communities in Turkey's Black Sea region that have different ecological environments and local economies. These Turkish communities share a common nationality, language, ethnicity, and geographic region, but differ in how socially interdependent they are.

This variation in social interdependence, Uskul and colleagues (2008) proposed, is due to the fact that these communities have been historically dependent on different kinds of occupations: farming, fishing, or herding. Farming and fishing, on the one hand, require high levels of social cohesion, group collaboration, and staying in one place (i.e., a lot of social interdependence). Herding, on the other hand, requires high levels of autonomy, individual decision making, and moving around to multiple places (i.e., a lot of social independence). They found that farmers and fishers, communities with greater social interdependence, thought more holistically, while herders, a community with greater social independence, thought more analytically. Talhelm and colleagues (2014) found complementary results when contrasting the effects of rice versus wheat agricultural legacies in China, with rice farming requiring much more social cohesion than wheat farming. In support of this hypothesis, they found that people from rice-growing, Southern provinces in China were more likely to be interdependent, holistic thinkers than people from wheat-growing, Northern provinces.

Psychologists have also started to take a more detailed look at when cultural differences in cognition emerge developmentally (see Masuda et al., Chapter 8, and Keller, Chapter 15, this volume). In one study that examined children's artwork, Senzaki, Masuda, and Nand (2014) found that Japanese and Canadian children produced similar landscape drawings (i.e., a drawing of a house and its surrounding environment) and understood the concept of a "horizon" in grade 1. However, by grade 2, cultural differences began to emerge. Japanese children in grade 2 drew the horizon significantly higher up in their pictures, and drew more objects in them overall, than Canadian children of the same age, mimicking a more holistic versus analytic style of visual representation prevalent in Japanese culture and aesthetics. In another study, researchers found that Japanese children's tendency to pay attention to the context—a common feature of a holistic cognitive style, called "context sensitivity"—increased by age, emerging by 6–7 years of age and reaching adult levels by 8–9 years of age (Imada, Carlson, & Itakura, 2013).

Emotion

Turning from cognition to emotion, researchers are continuing to study how people do emotion differently in multiple cultural contexts, and are now also looking at how emotional norms impact mental health and well-being, how emotions influence the ways in which people acculturate to new cultural contexts, and how emotional norms and biases play out in institutional contexts such as doctors' offices, schools, and workplaces. Over the past decade, scholars have also been expanding their work beyond East–West cultural comparisons, studying other kinds of cultural contexts, as well as identity intersections within national contexts (Mesquita, Boiger, & De Leersnyder, 2016; in this volume, see also Tsai & Colbert, Chapter 11; Mesquita, De Leersnyder, & Jasini, Chapter 19).

Culture and emotion researchers, for example, have weighed in on the long-standing

assumption that suppressing one's emotions is pernicious and can lead to negative mental and physical health outcomes. For example, Soto, Perez, Kim, Lee, and Minnick (2011) asked whether this should be the case in East Asian cultural contexts, in which showing emotional restraint is valued over freely expressing one's emotions. By comparing U.S. European American and Hong Kong Chinese college students' use of emotional suppression, life satisfaction, and mood, they found that suppression was related to negative psychological functioning (i.e., lower life satisfaction and depressed mood) for U.S. European American students but not for Hong Kong Chinese students. Since expressing one's emotions is part of being true to oneself in individualistic, independent U.S. culture, it follows that going against this emotional norm by regulating or suppressing one's emotions is experienced negatively by Americans. Since this emotional logic is not the norm in East Asian contexts, regulating or suppressing emotion is far less likely to result in this kind of negative experience. Instead, in East Asian contexts, negative feelings are an expected part of life, and control over emotional expressions that could disrupt important relations is highly valued and practiced (Curhan, Sims, et al., 2014b; Kitayama & Park, 2017; Miyamoto et al., 2013). These differences in emotional norms and how they are reflected and promoted in their respective culture cycles can explain why negative feelings are strong predictors of poor health in the United States but not in East Asian contexts.

The power of emotional norms is also evident when people move to a new cultural context. Recent research on emotion and acculturation (see Mesquita et al., Chapter 19, this volume) shows that the extent to which a person's emotional alignment or misalignment with a new culture can matter for transition and adjustment experiences, as well as general mental health and well-being. For instance, Consedine, Chentsova-Dutton, and Krivoshekova (2014) found that immigrant women from diverse places such as the Caribbean and Eastern Europe experienced worse health and well-being the less they fit U.S. emotional norms. They also found that the longer amount of time that these immigrant women spent in the United States, the more they came to fit mainstream American emotional norms. Likewise, De Leersnyder et al. (2011) found evidence of what they call "emotional acculturation"; that is, the more that Korean and Turkish immigrants to the United States were exposed to mainstream U.S. culture, and the more that they engaged in relationships with Americans, the more their emotions fit American norms.

Cultural differences in emotional norms also play out in important ways in institutional contexts and may be a significant but often unseen factor in bias. For example, Tsai and colleagues have explored how mismatches in people's "ideal affect," or how they would ideally like to feel, can play a role in whether people from different cultural groups communicate well with their doctors, think employees or leaders are successful, or see students as smart and engaged in school (e.g., Sims et al., 2018; Bencharit et al., 2018; see also Tsai & Clobert, Chapter 11, this volume). In one study, Tsai and colleagues (2016) found that top-ranked leaders in the United States expressed excitement by smiling big, toothy, "Julia Roberts" smiles in their official photos, while leaders in China expressed calm by smiling more modest, closed-mouth, "Mona Lisa" smiles in their official photos. These leaders' emotional expressions reflected differences in ideal affect in each culture: U.S. culture values excitement and high-arousal, positive emotions, while Chinese culture values calm and low-arousal, positive emotions (Tsai et al., 2006). These cultural differences in ideal affect may also contribute to bias when cultural mismatches arise. For example, Asian Americans in the United States are often stereotyped as being "too passive" to be strong leaders or "too quiet" to be the smartest students—culture clashes or misunderstandings that can be attributed, in part, to divergent emotional norms.

Motivation

Turning to motivation, researchers have continued to show how agency can take different forms across diverse cultural contexts, and they are now exploring how cultural goals shape choice and decision making as well as impact health and education behaviors (see Kim & Lawrie, Chapter 10, this volume). The idea that agency can come from "the outside"—from attunement to close others

and by following social norms and expectations—instead of "the inside"—from one's internal preferences and by following one's own personal attitudes and values—remains a challenging idea for many psychological scientists and people in the West in general (e.g., Kitayama et al., 2007; Markus, 2016; Riemer, Shavitt, Koo, & Markus, 2014; Stephens et al., 2009). Given the power of the Western, neoliberal narrative of choice and freedom in the U.S. and among elites around the world, expanding theories of agency and motivation is an uphill battle that involves bucking a deeply inscribed social and political construction. Increasingly, sociocultural analyses reveal that agency does not equal independence; in fact, in many parts of the world and among diverse groups within the United States itself, agency instead equals interdependence (Markus, 2017).

Studies have demonstrated the real-world significance of independent versus interdependent styles of agency and motivating behavior (Riemer et al., 2014). Eom and colleagues (2016), for example, challenged the prevailing assumption that increasing people's personal concerns about the environment is the best path to promoting proenvironmental behavior. In a study analyzing World Value Survey data from 42 nations, they found that people's proenvironmental beliefs were more likely to predict their support for proenvironmental action in countries that are high in individualism, which suggests that the link between belief and action is higher in countries where "the inside" matters most. In countries that are high in collectivism, such as Japan, where "the outside" matters most, they found that perceived proenvironment social norms were instead more predictive of people's proenvironmental decisions.

Along similar lines, Ramesh and Gelfand (2010) examined job turnover in India and the United States, two of the world's most influential economies. While it is important to employees in both India and the United States to feel like they "fit" with their respective companies or organizations, different aspects of fit actually predict job turnover (Ramesh & Gelfand, 2010). In the United States, a country high in individualism, with a culture that values "the inside," employees are more likely to leave their jobs when they feel that their roles do not fit them personally. In India, a country high in collectivism, with a culture that values "the outside," employees are more likely to leave their jobs when they feel that they do not have strong connections with other people in the organization.

Looking at studies in education, research has shown that some students are motivated to succeed in school by their connections with others rather than their own individual goals and preferences (e.g., Covarrubias et al., 2016; Fu & Markus, 2014; Stephens et al., 2012). Fu and Markus (2014), for example, found that while Asian American students feel more interdependent with their mothers, and feel more pressure from them to succeed than do their European American peers, this pressure does not put a strain on their relationships or undermine their motivation. Stephens and colleagues (2012) showed that first-generation college students (i.e., students who are the first in their families to attend college) face an unseen disadvantage at many American colleges and universities due to the high value that these schools place on students' individualism and independence. First-generation college students frequently hail from working-class worlds in which "the outside" is valued more than "the inside," and their educational and learning goals are more collectivistic and interdependent than individualistic and independent, resulting in a cultural mismatch.

Growing Up: Psychological Development

Given that the cultural and the psychological make each other up, it follows that culture should play a powerful role in psychological development. Researchers who study culture and development have been making theoretical and empirical strides over the past decade, proposing models of cultural variation in development and producing compelling empirical demonstrations of how culture interacts with a variety of developmental processes (see Keller, Chapter 15, this volume).

The last decade of research reveals multiple pathways for healthy human development that are informed by diverse cultural and ecological models of the self, childhood, and familial relationships (e.g., Keller, 2013; Keller & Kärtner, 2013; Schröder, Kärtner, Keller, & Chaudhary, 2012; Q. Wang, 2008); different ways of conceptualizing how children learn by participating in cultural ways of life (e.g., Rogoff, Mejía-Arauz, & Correa-Chávez, 2015; Rogoff, 2014; Tobin, Hsueh, & Karasawa, 2009); and changing norms around development as societies evolve and respond to global trends such as formal schooling and technology use (e.g., Greenfield, 2009; Manago, 2015; Park, Twenge, & Greenfield, 2014).

As an example of this research, Kärtner, Keller, and Chaudhary (2010) studied how culture can foster different pathways to the same developmental milestones. Specifically, they examined emerging prosocial behavior among German and Indian toddlers. In the West, where developing an autonomous and independent self is the norm, developmental scientists have theorized and found empirical support for the idea that having empathy or showing concern for others necessitates being able to distinguish oneself from another person. This is called "self–other differentiation." Comparing children from middle-class families in Germany and India, a cultural context where developing a relational and interdependent self is instead the norm, Kärtner and colleagues found that while self–other differentiation was associated with increased prosociality among German toddlers, it was not among Indian toddlers. The researchers concluded that there might be another kind of developmental "trigger" in Indian culture, one that does not rely on separating the self from others. Building on the idea that psychological scientists need to question their assumptions about so-called "universal" development processes, research shows that even a number of truisms among Western parents—such as "Beware of stranger danger" or "Don't play with knives"—are grounded in cultural norms and assumptions about healthy development that do not hold up in other places around the world (e.g., Lancy, 2016; Marey-Sarwane, Keller, & Otto, 2016).

Externalizing the Psyche: Norms and Morality

We are also learning more about how norms operate across a variety of different cultures, transmitting shared knowledge and guiding moral decision making and behavior. In psychology, "norms" are typically defined as unwritten social rules that guide the kinds of behavior that people find acceptable versus frowned upon. Norms and morals help people answer the "big questions" in a given society, orienting them toward what is good, right, and true and away from what is bad, wrong, and false (Shweder, 1991).

Social and cultural psychologists, as we have noted, ground their scholarship in the theoretical and empirical pursuit of showing the myriad powerful ways the social context influences people's behavior. The science of cultural norms takes this work even further by analyzing how social norms both perpetuate culture and inspire culture change, and by examining how norms work at both the individual (or micro) and collective (or macro) levels. Studies over the past decade have focused on what shapes the content and strength of cultural norms, when people adhere to rather than deviate from cultural norms, and how social norms can be leveraged to change cultures (Gelfand, 2012; Gelfand & Jackson, 2016; Morris et al., 2015b). While scholars across fields often distinguish between what are called "injunctive norms" (i.e., what people should do) and "descriptive norms" (i.e., what people actually do), researchers have found that this distinction is often blurred among everyday social actors (Eriksson, Strimling, & Coutlas, 2015) or that both kinds of norms often function together as culture operates as shared common sense or as intersubjective perception (Gelfand & Jackson, 2016; Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010; Zou et al., 2009).

Looking at the relative strength of cultural norms across societies, Gelfand and colleagues compared the antecedents and consequences of so-called "tight" versus "loose" cultures (e.g., Gelfand et al., 2011; Harrington & Gelfand, 2014; Mu, Kitayama, Han, & Gelfand, 2015; Roos, Gelfand, Nau, & Lun, 2015). "Tight" cultures are defined as those that have strong norms and a low tolerance for norm deviance (e.g., Singapore, South Korea), while "loose" cultures are defined as those that have weaker norms and a higher tolerance for norm deviance (e.g., the Netherlands, Israel). In a multilevel analysis of 33 national cultures, they found that nations with a history of ecological

uncertainty and threat were more likely to have tight (vs. loose) cultures, which could be explained by a historical need to coherently organize or coordinate social interaction to respond to and survive those threats (Gelfand et al., 2011; Roos et al., 2015; for an analysis of the neurobiology of tightness-looseness, see Mu et al., 2015; for a complementary set of within-nation findings, see Harrington & Gelfand, 2014).

In addition to identifying cross-cultural variation in moral systems and moral judgments, researchers are now focusing on the role of moral behavior in everyday practice and cultural conflicts, as well as investigating differences among subgroups within national cultures (e.g., Buchtel et al., 2015; A. Cohen, 2009; Graham, Meindl, Beall, Johnson, & Zhang, 2016; Oishi, 2010; Piff, Stancato, Côté, Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012; Rai & Fiske, 2011; see also Miller, Wice, & Goyal, Chapter 16, this volume). Haidt and Graham's moral foundations theory has been particularly influential, organizing moral differences along six dimensions: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, liberty/oppression, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Graham, 2007). This framework has been useful for explaining differences in liberal and conservative political ideologies that fuel the American "culture wars" (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Whereas conservatives, for example, tend to value the six dimensions equally, liberals value harm/care and fairness/reciprocity above the others (Graham et al., 2009).

Materializing the Psyche: Cultural Products

"Because cultural psychology is the study of both person-shaped cultural contexts and culturally shaped persons," Lamoreaux and Morling urged in 2012, "the field should include measures of cultural difference at both of these levels" (p. 299). Over the past decade, cultural psychologists have heeded this call, learning more about how to measure cultural patterns and tendencies outside of the head by analyzing a wide variety of cultural products.

Cultural products are artifacts or tangible objects—such as computers, phones, books or texts, artwork and songs, consumer advertisements and products, or media—that reflect and reproduce psychological tendencies in a given culture (D. Cohen & Leung, 2009; Lamoreaux & Morling, 2012; Morling, 2016; Morling & Lamoreaux, 2008). As such, cultural products both represent and transmit cultural patterns in ideas and values; they also reflect and transmit aspects of both cultural stability and change. In a meta-analysis of 51 studies of cultural products (i.e., books and texts, Internet and e-mail content, magazine and TV ads, press coverage), Morling and Lamoreaux (2008) found that Western cultural products were more individualistic and less collectivistic than East Asian and Mexican cultural products. In a follow-up study, they also found that cultural products reflected a number of other dimensions of cultural difference beyond individualism and collectivism (Lamoreaux & Morling, 2012). Japanese cultural products, for instance, scored lower than U.S. products on positivity and hedonism, mirroring cultural variation in self-concept and ideal affect.

In recent years, researchers have catalogued cultural differences in self-concept, ideal affect, cognitive style, equality, and power by analyzing children's books (e.g., Imada, 2012; Dehghani et al., 2013; Tsai, Louie, Chen, & Uchida, 2007a), greeting cards (e.g., Choi & Ross, 2011; Koopmann-Holm & Tsai, 2014), religious texts (e.g., Tsai, Miao, & Seppala, 2007b), artwork (e.g., Masuda et al., 2008; Nand, Masuda, Senzaki, & Ishii, 2014), advertising appeals (e.g., Shavitt, Johnson, & Zhang, 2011), and even academic presentations (H. Wang, Masuda, Ito, & Rashid, 2012). In addition to showing how cultural products reflect enduring cultural differences, they have also found evidence of how cultural products can be used to study cultural change (Morling, 2016). DeWall, Pond, Campbell, and Twenge (2011), for example, found that popular American song lyrics have become more self-involved over time. To do so, they looked at word use in the most popular American songs between 1980 and 2007, and found that heightened self-focus and decreased social connection—two common trends in the U.S. during that time period—were reflected in lyrics that increasingly communicated anger and antisocial behavior.

Multiple Cultures: Multiculturalism and Cultural Learning

Psychologists are also learning more about how to theorize and empirically demonstrate the ways that multiple cultures interact, clash, and combine to shape people's psychological experiences. In today's globalized world, interacting with multiple, intersecting cultures at a rapid rate is increasingly the norm for most people, not just immigrants, sojourners, or those with multicultural backgrounds. Moreover, many countries, such as the United States, are also experiencing significant demographic shifts within their borders. Analyzing the impact of these social forces requires more dynamic, interactive, and complex ways to describe and study how the cultural influences the psychological.

In the past decade, research on multicultural identity, cultural priming or frame switching between multiple cultures, multiculturalism's influence on creativity and innovation, and people's acculturation and adjustment experiences as they transition to new cultures have continued to thrive (e.g., Benet-Martínez & Hong, 2014; Chiu & Cheng, 2007; Chiu & Kwan, 2016; Y. Hong, Zhan, Morris, & Benet-Martínez, 2016; Morris et al., 2015a; see also Leung & Koh, Chapter 21; Mesquita et al., Chapter 19, and Chiu & Hong, Chapter 26, this volume). Other research on this topic has looked at how people who are multicultural in various ways think about race and experience discrimination and exclusion, as well as how different kinds of ideologies about diversity and multiculturalism affect people's behavior as well as organizational and social policies (e.g., Chao, Hong, & Chiu, 2013; Cho, Morris, Slepian, & Tadmor, 2017; Rosenthal & Levy, 2012; Sanchez-Hucles & Davis, 2010; Tadmor, Chao, Hong, & Polzer, 2013). Researchers have also examined the psychological processes and outcomes of cultural learning, or how people acquire culture-related knowledge (see Leung & Koh, Chapter 21, and Morris, Fincher, & Savani, Chapter 18, this volume).

Taking a look at recent research on cultural learning, Ang and colleagues, for example, have studied what they call "cultural intelligence" or CQ: the capacity to "adapt effectively to situations of cultural diversity" (Earley & Ang, 2003, p. 3). Building on this work, Leung and colleagues have also identified "cultural metaknowledge" or "knowledge of people's knowledge in a certain culture rather than general knowledge about the culture itself" as another important component of cultural learning (Leung, Lee, & Chiu, 2013, p. 993). Mor, Morris, and Joh (2013) found that a particular kind of cultural metaknowledge, "cultural perspective taking," or considering how another's cultural background shapes one's behavior in a particular situation, can promote cooperation with people from other cultures. This work takes the idea of cultural competence into the psychological domain, moving beyond a more traditional skills-based framework to unpack the underlying psychological processes involved in learning about culture and cultural differences.

To capture more fully how intercultural contact is an essential part of being human, Morris et al. (2015a) have proposed that psychological scientists adopt a "polycultural" perspective on culture, which is "a network conception of culture in which cultural influence on individuals is partial and plural and cultural traditions interact and change each other" (p. 634). While most scholars in the field would certainly agree with this perspective, Morris and colleagues urged cultural psychologists to recognize that some current theoretical models and empirical paradigms still communicate a categorical and stable view of culture, even if this is not their intent, and that this can have detrimental consequences for the field. Researchers have also started to study how thinking about culture as "polycultural" influences laypeople's attitudes and behaviors. For instance, Cho and colleagues (2017) found that priming a "polycultural mindset"—or the belief that cultures interact with one another, change, and evolve—can encourage people to prefer consumer products that promote cultural fusion (e.g., English tea blended with Chinese herbs).

Spanning these recent empirical advances and bodies of work, it is clear that researchers are becoming more sophisticated at analyzing cultural and psychological dynamics across multiple levels of analysis—across groups, individuals, and situations—to better understand their processes and mechanisms (Q. Wang, 2016; see D. Cohen, Chapter 6, this volume). They are also diver-

sifying the kinds of cultures, culture clashes, and cultural divides under study, and this is inspiring new questions about how the cultural and the psychological interact (A. Cohen, 2009; see Part V: Different Forms of Culture, this volume). Finally, as we have highlighted throughout this chapter, scholars are even more broadly and deeply investigating how culture is at work in the world, from issues of mental and physical health, workplace diversity, educational equity, and policymaking (in this volume, see Part IV: Culture and Economic Behavior; Miyamoto et al., Chapter 12; Chentsova-Dutton & Ryder, Chapter 14). In this vein, we can consider what a cultural psychology perspective could add to organizational studies and also to investigating the professions more deeply as forms of culture (e.g., teaching, policing, coding; Adler & Aycan, 2018; Cheryan, Plaut, Handron, & Hudson, 2013; Master, Cheryan, & Meltzoff, 2016).

LOOKING AHEAD: FROM CULTURE CLASHES TO CULTURE CHANGE

Looking back at the research examples we highlight in Figure 1.1, as well as throughout this chapter, it is hard to deny the myriad compelling ways that culture is at work in the world and in our psychology. As cultural psychology has continued to thrive as a field over the past decade, both deepening and broadening our understanding of how our cultures and our psyches make each other up, people in societies around the world have experienced the power of cultures clashing and interacting at ever-increasing rates. Our headlines and social media feeds are increasingly populated with news of culture clashes or cultural divides that take place within organizations, within nations, and across geographic borders. From gender clashes in Silicon Valley tech companies such as Uber and Google, to race clashes between the police and communities of color in American suburbs and cities such as New York City and Ferguson, to political clashes between conservatives and progressives in recent elections and on college campuses, to religion clashes between Muslim diaspora groups and their European and American host communities, cultural differences—and, most often, cultural misunderstandings—frequently play a leading role (Markus & Conner, 2014).

At the heart of these culture clashes are questions about how to understand the meaning and nature of social differences, as well as how to understand the ways in which social differences more often than not manifest as forms of inequality and marginalization (e.g., Adams, Dobles, Gómez, Kurtiş, & Molina, 2015; Adler & Aycan, 2018; Markus, 2008; Markus & Moya, 2010; Omi & Winant, 1986/2015; Salter & Adams, 2013). Given the demographic changes, cultural interactions and hybridizations, and shifting power dynamics that people in societies around the world confront every day, we ask how psychological scientists can leverage insights from cultural psychology to help shed light on these issues. In particular, we propose that cultural psychologists are uniquely positioned to (1) reveal and explain the psychological dynamics that underlie today's most significant culture clashes and (2) suggest ways to change or improve cultural practices and institutions to foster a more inclusive, equal, and effective multicultural society.

The issues we highlight here are certainly not new, and they have motivated many a budding cultural psychologist to take up the field. We do, however, propose that incorporating the current trend toward intervention studies in social psychology will provide even more useful theoretical and practical insights for the field and its applications. In the words of psychologist Walter Dearborn, also commonly attributed to Kurt Lewin, "If you want to understand something, try to change it" (in Bronfenbrenner, 1979, p. 37). Social psychologists have taken up this mantle with renewed vigor in recent years as researchers have worked to show how using key social-psychological insights to design brief, targeted, "wise" interventions can produce lasting and meaningful behavior change in diverse domains such as education, health, and politics (for reviews, see G. Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Walton & Wilson, 2018; Yeager & Walton, 2011). Extending these learnings from the psychological science of intervention, how can we apply this perspective to not only behavior change but also culture change?

Since the cultural and the psychological necessarily make each other up, one way to change minds and behaviors is to change cultures, just as one way to change cultures is to change minds and behaviors. It is important to note that this kind of intentional or strategic culture change differs from other significant work in the field on cultural evolution or long-term culture change (e.g., Greenfield, 2009, 2013; Grossman & Varnum, 2015; Varnum & Grossman, 2017; Twenge, Campbell, & Gentile, 2012a, 2012b). While research in this area is primarily concerned with how cultures shift, change, or evolve across time, we ask here: How can targeted, "wise" interventions in the culture cycle help people address today's most significant cultural clashes and combat inequality? So far in this chapter, we have used the culture cycle as a tool to conceptualize the dynamic processes through which the cultural and the psychological mutually constitute one another (Figure 1.2). We have also used the culture cycle to represent the power dynamics and downward constitution at play in historically derived resource and status differences among cultures and social groups (Figure 1.4). Here, we apply the culture cycle to unpack the psychological dynamics that underlie two timely culture clashes prevalent on college campuses and in the media today, and suggest how we can strategically intervene in the culture cycle to foster more effective and inclusive practices and institutions to address these clashes. These clashes include the experience of first-generation college students from predominantly working-class backgrounds transitioning to the middle- to upper-class culture of higher education, and the fractured relationship between law enforcement and communities of color in U.S. cities and suburbs.

To analyze culture clashes using the culture cycle and identify or target key areas within the cycle to initiate or catalyze culture change, we propose starting by considering the following set of orienting questions (Figure 1.5).

Using the culture cycle to map culture clashes and identify places to intervene in the culture cycle, it is important to keep several points in mind. As we noted previously, all four levels of the culture cycle are equally influential—none is assumed to be more significant or powerful than the others as they work together in a dynamic, mutually constituting system. When it comes to culture change, however, culture changers need to consider whether the levels are working together to reinforce or buttress one another, or whether they might be working against one another, causing spots of tension and misalignment (e.g., Coyle, 2018; Gibbons, 2015; Kotter, 2012; Morgan, 2006; Porras & Silvers, 1991). They also need to consider whether people within a given culture, and among the different levels, have consensus or a shared understanding of what is taking place and why in a given setting. Furthermore, given that psychologists are typically trained to focus on the individual, and also sometimes the interactional levels, they tend to zero in on changing people's mindsets or construals without fully considering how these micro- or meso-level changes might interact with the larger institutional and social forces at play. On the other hand, practitioners and policymakers often focus on these macro-social and institutional factors and, in turn, do not pay close enough attention to the interactional and individual levels. As cultural psychologists, we can work to take a more holistic, interactive, and dynamic approach that considers each of the levels in tandem. Thinking through the questions we present in Figure 1.5 can help scholars and practitioners alike unpack the sources of culture clashes and divides, as well as think through where they might wisely catalyze or coordinate culture change efforts.

- *Culture clash 1: First-generation or working-class college students in middle-to-upper class college and university settings.* The first culture clash that has garnered a lot of attention in recent years at colleges and universities around the country. First-generation college students—or students who are the first in their families to go to college—often experience a clash between their working-class upbringings and the middle- to upper-class culture of higher education, especially at elite schools. Recent research reveals that the culture of U.S. higher education is not neutral. It both reflects and promotes class-based norms, values, and assumptions about what it means to be "smart," "educated," and "successful" (Fryberg et al., 2013; Quaye & Harper, 2015; Stephens et al., 2012). As a result, first-generation students often feel excluded or different from others in college settings,

Ideas: How are social differences (e.g., nation, social class, race or ethnicity, gender) conceptualized or represented at the ideas level in terms of norms, values, and ideologies?

- Are social differences conceptualized as internal, essential, and as deficits or as contextual, adaptive, and as assets?
- Do pervasive ideas reflect a commitment to color blindness, multiculturalism, or polycultural ideologies? Are they a blend or mixed?

Institutions: How are social differences formalized at the institutional level in terms of policies, organizational structures, or features?

- Are social differences reinforced as deficits or as assets through institutional dynamics, policies, structures, and features?
- Do institutional policies, structures, or features ignore, reinforce, or contest difference?

Interactions: How are people or groups interacting with one another with respect to social differences?

- Are social differences treated as assets or deficits through formal and informal practices, relational dynamics, and artifacts that people encounter in daily life?
- Do people identify with particular social groups? If so, how? How important are they for people's identities?

Individuals: How are people experiencing their own and others' social differences?

- Are social differences experienced as inferior, irrational, abnormal, misunderstood, and excluded, or valued, rational, normal, understood, and included?
- Do people feel threatened or empowered when their identity is salient?

Cross-level questions:

- Is there a consensus or lack of consensus in the cultural context about how to answer the previous questions?
- How do the four levels work together? Are they relatively aligned or misaligned?

FIGURE 1.5. Understanding culture clashes and targeting culture change.

which can lead them to question whether they fit or belong (Covarrubias & Fryberg, 2015; Ostrove & Long, 2007; Walton & Cohen, 2007). Students from low-income or working-class backgrounds may also be unfamiliar with the "rules of the game" that are needed to succeed in higher education, which can undermine their sense of empowerment and efficacy (Housel & Harvey, 2009; Ostrove & Long, 2007; Reay, Crozier, & Clayton, 2009). As such, typical college environments can systematically disadvantage first-generation students, contributing to an achievement gap with their continuing-generation peers (i.e., students who have at least one parent with a 4-year degree; Astin & Oseguera, 2004; Bowen, Kurzweil, & Tobin, 2005; Croizet & Millet, 2011; Goudeau & Croizet, 2017; Sirin, 2005; Stephens et al., 2012). These kinds of psychological challenges work alongside disparities in resources and precollege preparation to fuel the social class achievement gap.

Where in a college or university's culture cycle might we intervene to make its values, policies, and practices more inclusive of and equitable for first-generation students? Research in social and cultural psychology shows that educating students about how their social class backgrounds can shape their college experiences, teaching students to understand how social differences can be an asset, and changing college norms to be more interdependent and collectivistic (vs. independent and individualistic) can be effective intervention strategies that foster academic and social success for first-generation students (Dittmann & Stephens, 2017; Stephens, Brannon, Markus, & Nelson, 2015; Stephens, Fryberg, et al., 2012; Stephens, Hamedani, et al., 2014). In particular, these strategies center around helping first-generation students adopt a new lay theory of social difference and experience their backgrounds and perspectives as part of, rather than separate from, the mainstream college environment.

To apply these strategies to change college cultures, we might ask how colleges and universities might address the following at each level of the culture cycle. For example, to help first-generation students feel empowered at the *individual level,* schools could assign first-generation students "big sibs" or mentors that are first-generation graduate students or faculty to help advise them and act as role models (*interactions level*); institute an intergroup dialogue class or counter storytelling workshop requirement for all incoming first-year students that highlights how people's different social class backgrounds can be resources (*institutions level*); or elevate and normalize interdependent or collectivistic values and academic motivations in college or university promotional materials such as "giving back to your community" (*ideas level*). Ideally, to have the biggest impact, culture change is more likely to progress when there is change at each level and these changes work to support and reinforce one another over time.

- *Culture clash 2: Police–community relations in communities of color.* The second culture clash has a long, fraught history in the United States: police–community relations in communities of color, especially in African American communities. The tense relationship between law enforcement and communities of color is one of the most contentious culture clashes in the U.S. today, with officer-involved shootings of unarmed black male civilians being one of the major catalysts of the modern racial justice movement. Since the rise of Black Lives Matter in response to the shootings of unarmed black boys and men such as Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, and Akai Gurley, police–community relations are seriously fractured, and many Americans, especially those in low-income communities of color, do not trust the police or believe that law enforcement exists to keep them safe (La Vigne, Fontaine, & Dwivedi, 2017; Morin, Parker, Stepler, & Mercer, 2017; Pegues, 2017). In this climate, there have been numerous calls for police departments around the country to reexamine and change their cultures, which have been called toxic, violent, disrespectful, and macho (Armacost, 2016; A. Hall, Hall, & Perry, 2016). At the same time, many officers across the country think that the public does not understand the nature of their jobs and the risks that they face (Morin et al., 2017; Pegues, 2017). As such, politicians, law enforcement professionals, and community activists have been grappling with how

to bridge the so-called "black and blue" divide. From the effects of implicit racial bias to the tension between so-called guardian versus warrior mindsets, to the use of new technologies such as body-worn cameras, to the implementation of procedural justice and community-based policing practices, police and community members alike are struggling with how to work together effectively and come up with solutions that address concerns on both sides of the divide (e.g., Eberhardt, 2016; A. Hall et al., 2016; Hetey & Eberhardt, 2014; Lyons-Padilla, Hamedani, Markus, & Eberhardt, 2018; President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015; Trinkner, Tyler, & Goff, 2016; Tyler, Goff, & MacCoun, 2015; Voigt et al., 2017).

Where in a police department's culture cycle might we intervene to help increase trust and cooperation among police and community members? On the policing side, law enforcement professionals and researchers alike have proposed the following evidence-based solutions to help police departments evaluate and improve their practices: Develop officers' procedural justice and community-based policing skills, educate officers about implicit bias, diversify the police force, increase cross-race experience and dialogue, leverage technology to identify disparities and evaluate training initiatives, attend to officers' social and emotional needs, increase departmental accountability and transparency, and improve internal procedural justice (Eberhardt, 2016; Gilmartin, 2002; A. Hall et al., 2016; Lyons-Padilla, Hamedani, Markus, & Eberhardt, 2018; Pegues, 2017; President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015; Tyler et al., 2015; Voigt et al., 2017). In particular, a number of these strategies shift officers away from a warrior mindset that casts black males, in particular, as "enemies" or "others," to a guardian mindset that is more relational or other-focused and motivated by why many officers joined the police force to begin with—to help people.

To apply these strategies to change the culture of police departments, we might ask how law enforcement agencies can address the following at each level of the culture cycle. For example, to help police officers adopt a guardian mindset (*individual level*), law enforcement agencies could provide more positive opportunities for sworn staff to learn about and interact with the local communities they serve but sometimes do not live (*interactions level*); reward procedural justice or community-based policing behaviors when considering raises and promotions (*institutional level*); and integrate procedural justice and community-based policing values into departmental strategic plans, missions, and visions (*ideas level*). Ideally, to ensure the strongest impact, culture change will be more likely to progress if law enforcement agencies work on their legitimacy issues with the communities they serve by being transparent and involving community stakeholders in their culture change efforts.

Culture change is difficult work and may have unintended consequences. Culture changers need to keep in mind how the interconnecting, shifting dynamics that make up the culture cycle afford certain ways of being, while constraining or downwardly constituting others, and that this can change or rebalance when intervening in the cycle. Culture changers also need to recognize that in terms of fostering more inclusive, equal, and effective institutions and practices, the deeper work often involves actually changing how people think about the meaning and nature of the social difference (e.g., Markus, 2008; Markus & Moya, 2010).

CONCLUSIONS: CULTURE IS TRENDING

People are culturally shaped shapers. In demonstrating this point, we have ranged from the biological to the societal, reviewing research on genes and also on police–community divides. Across domains, at every level of behavior, people invoke culture as they struggle to make sense of themselves and their worlds. In brief, it is an excellent time to be a cultural scientist, a cultural psychologist, or to add sociocultural analysis techniques to one's "making sense of behavior" toolkit. The pay is variable, but the work is unlimited and infinitely challenging. And the possibility to make a positive difference in scientific understanding and in the applications of these understandings is real.

The innovative and groundbreaking research reviewed here gives rise to more questions than answers, but the questions are now somewhat different in nature than in earlier decades. Cultural psychological questions are no longer shadowed by the suspicion that cultural differences are merely superficial or something to be tackled at some point only after basic human functioning has been mapped and described. The psychological is cultural and the cultural is psychological. Culture exists both in the head and in the world; it is made up of both conceptual and material elements; and its influence on the psychological can be analyzed and measured not only through people's reactions and responses, but also through analyses of products, practices, and policies that reflect and promote pervasive cultural ideas. While cultural psychologists have been laboring to refine the field, it has become clear that the world outside of the ivory tower needs their insights and solutions now more than ever.

The phrase "It's cultural" often reveals people's frustration that a problem is messy and intractable, too big and complex to parse and solve. Sometimes people use that phrase as a way to say a problem is systemic, but they often use it to deflect responsibility and say that a problem is not really "our" problem. The good news is that, as highlighted by the work we have reviewed in the chapter, psychologists are now equipped with the theories, methods, techniques, and applications to make it our problem. We think that cultural psychologists are more than ready to take up this challenge.

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CHAPTER 2

A History of Cultural Psychology

Cultural Psychology as a Tradition and a Movement

Yoshihisa Kashima

Cultural psychology as embodied in the current edition of the *Handbook of Cultural Psychology* is an intellectual movement located in cultural psychology as an intellectual tradition whose historical roots may be found in the Enlightenment and Romantic schools of thought, and their conceptions of the person, in 18th- and 19th-century Western Europe. The chapter traces their influence in the history of psychology as an academic discipline in the form of natural scientific versus cultural scientific models of psychological investigation—emergence, entrenchment, and ebbing of this structure—in interaction with global history, and describes the historical context in which contemporary cultural psychology appeared as an approach that regards humans as meaning-making beings. The chapter then observes an emerging conception of the person that challenges the Enlightenment–Romantic assumption separating culture from nature, and notes its reflection in cultural psychology's recent push to naturalize culture in the early 21st century against the backdrop of the global challenges to humanity, including climate change and intergroup conflict. The chapter concludes with a call for new conceptions of the person that regard culture *in* nature, which can help orient cultural psychology for the future.

Cultural psychology has two senses. In one sense, it is an intellectual movement that came into prominence in the late 20th century; in the other sense, it is a primarily Western European intellectual tradition that has continued since the 19th century. The publication of *Cultural Psychology: Essays on Comparative Human Development* (Stigler, Shweder, & Herdt, 1990) marked the start of the former with Richard Shweder's (1990) essay, "Cultural Psychology—What Is It?" The first edition of the *Handbook of Cultural Psychology* (Kitayama & Cohen, 2007) was very much a product of this movement. However, it finds its inspiration in the early writings of the Romantics of the 19th century. To wit, Shweder's (1984a) essay, "Anthropology's Romantic Rebellion against the Enlightenment, or There's More to Thinking Than Reason and Evidence," links Shweder's thinking on psychological anthropology to the Romantic intellectual tradition, from which cultural psychology as a tradition draws.

In many ways, these two senses of cultural psychology—movement and tradition—are